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Abstract. Balkan countries draw attention of many countries and investors after eastern 
bloc countries spread to free market economy. Moreover, these countries need to attract 
foreign capital as a development instrumental in order to adapt to the market system. They, 
for the purpose of attracting foreign capital inflow to their own countries, utilize tax 
advantages with many other applications. In this study, the relationship between foreign 
capital and tax in 11 Balkan Countries is examined. Annual data for the period of 2006-
2014 was used in this study. System GMM (Dynamic Panel Data) was preferred as a model 
in this study. According to the findings through the analyses, a negative relationship is 
observed between indirect taxes and foreign direct capital investments for the sample 
countries while a positive relationship is found between total tax obligations, obtained from 
profit based, and foreign direct capital investments.  
Keywords. FDI, Tax rates, Panel data. 
JEL. F21, H25, C23. 
 
1. Introduction 
n today‟s world, globalization process has been increasingly developed, 
significant technological improvements have been achieved in transportation 
and communication areas and specific concentration has been built in economic 
integration between countries. On the other hand, de-regulation policies, which 
come to force mostly after 1973 Petroleum Crisis, replaced regulation policies of 
Second World War. Moreover, the importance of capital movements within 
countries on national economies has been increased day by day. Likewise, the 
share of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflow to global GDP reached to the level 
of 3,35%, just before 2008 Global Financial Crisis, in 2007 while it was in the level 
of only 0,39% as of 1970. Similarly, the portion of FDI inflows to all gross fixed 
capital investments reached to 14,06% from 1,54% as of the same period 
(UNCTAD, 2015a). Therefore, this reflects an increase of 858% in GDP term and 
of 912% in fixed investments term. 
Even though some sort of inconsistency could be experienced in foreign capital 
flows because of global vulnerability caused by 2008 economic crisis, the 
competition for attracting foreign capital within countries has continued. As of 
2014, China was the country which had most amount of FDI with $129 billion 
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while it was followed by Hong Kong with $103billion and USA with $92 billion. 
In the analysis of capital inflows depending on national degree, it could be seen 
that Asia-Pacific region economies (APEC) established nearly 53% of the whole 
global capital inflows with $652 billion. On the other hand, in capital outflows 
analysis, USA became the first country with $337 billion and Hong Kong and 
China followed USA with $143 billion and $116 billion, respectively (UNCTAD, 
2015b). 
As result of foreign capital inflow attracting competition within countries, 
various public incentives were brought into attention. Such initiatives, which are 
applied in many economies including especially developing countries which have 
experienced capital accumulation deficit problem, in the purpose of attracting 
investments, could be examined under four different titles. Among these, financial 
instrumentals include direct governmental subventions which were applied in order 
to improve the investment climate. Regulative instrumentals are the second one as 
they aim to make host countries‟ environment standards and labor market rules 
flexible. Technic instrumentals are used to eliminate knowledge asymmetry, 
managerial difficulties and time delays. Fiscal instrumentals, which are also 
frequently used in action, cover mainly tax incentives. (OECD, 2003; UNCTAD, 
2004; Johnson et. al, 2013). 
Tax incentives cover different instruments including corporate income tax 
allowances, tax exemptions in investments, investment loans, accelerated 
depreciation practices, deduction in social security contribution payments, tax 
allowances in R&D, and customs tariff deductions for imported capital (UNCTAD, 
2000; Holland & Vann, 1998; Fletcher, 2002; Kargı, 2014b). However, global 
basis distribution of these applications differs. Developed countries generally 
utilize these incentives to expand global competition power of local capital while 
developing countries and transition economies use them to improve industries 
within their countries and to attract foreign capital (Easson & Zolt, 2002). 
Therefore, tax incentive related to Technologies, for examples incentives to 
increase R&D researches, are more frequently applied in developed countries, 
including Far East, Pacific region and OECD countries, on the other hand, 
generally other tax related incentives are utilized in less developed or developing 
countries (James, 2013). 
 
2. Tax Applications and FDC Investments in Balkan 
Countries 
Economic development levels of Balkan countries differ from each other. 
According to GDP per capita, the richest countries of the region are Slovenia and 
Greece while the poorest countries are Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(World Bank, 2016). Balkans was highly affected by 2008 crisis, in negative 
manner. Following the crisis, Romania, Montenegro, Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria 
economies lowered between rates of -%4 and -%7. At the same time, the crisis 
increased unemployment rates of the countries in the region, especially of Greece. 
The most negative effect of 2008 crisis in public economy area was state‟s 
increasing financial obligations. Following the crisis, the ratio of budget deficit to 
GDP in Greece increased as more than twice from -8% to -17% (World Bank, 
2016), while Slovenia, Serbia, Kosovo, Albania and Montenegro encountered 
budget deficit rates, differing from nearly -4% to -13% (Pasquali, 2015). 
Balkan Countries excluding Turkey and Greece are known as transition 
economies (old socialist economies) important changes in these countries‟ tax 
systems were experienced with the processes of transition to market economy and 
getting membership in EU (Appel, 2006; Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 1999); 
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likewise various tax related incentives were put into application in order to increase 
foreign capital inflow (Cass, 2007; Mitra & Stern, 2002). Factors including 
privatization activities, banking reforms and European Union membership had 
important effects on FDI inflows during this period (Popescu, 2014). However, the 
desired FDI inflow level could be reached in the first years of the transition even 
though the applied reform efforts and incentives and foreign capital inflows 
remained lower bars depending on the political and economic inconsistency 
experienced heavily during 1990‟s (Estrin & Uvalic, 2013). 
On the other hand, today, an obvious increase in foreign capital inflows to the 
regions could be observed. Total FDI inflow, received by Balkan countries as of 
2014, is approximately $29,6 billion. On the other hand, the value for 1994 was 
about $2,4 billion. However, it could not be said that each country in the region had 
equal amount of FDI. Turkey has the most amount of FDI inflow with nearly $12,7 
while Macedonia has the lowest level of FDI with nearly $60,8 million. On the 
other hand, Montenegro has the biggest portion of FDI when FDI inflow is rated 
with GDP value. This particular country‟s FDI inflow rate to its GDP is 10,8%. 
Croatia has ranked as number one with 928 depending on FDI per capita (World 
Bank, 2016). 
Countries in the region have carried an intense tax competition in order to get 
more shares in FDI inflows (Shala, 2013; Šimović & Žaja, 2010). This situation 
could be observed through the changes in tax rates. Only three of Balkan countries 
(Greece, Serbia and Albania) lately increased their Corporate Income Tax rates 
(CIT) while other countries made discounts as rates from 5% to 15% during the 
period of 2001-2013. Nowadays, the country which has the lowest level of CIT is 
Montenegro while the country which has the highest level of CIT is Greece. A 
similar structure could also be observed for Personal Income Tax (PIT) and Value 
Added Tax (VAT). The country which has the lowest level of personal income tax 
is Montenegro (9%) while the country which has the highest level of CIT is 
Slovenia (50%). The differences in Indirect Taxes are more subtle and Kosovo 
applies the lowest rate with 16% while Croatia applies the highest rate with 25% 
(KPMG, 2016; OECD, 2010; Pomerleau, 2014; Imeri, 2013). VAT rate is higher 
than both CIT and PIT in Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Macedonia, Albania, Serbia and Romania. This finding shows that the related 
countries use taxes in the purpose of increasing capital inflow and investments, and 
therefore, they associate taxes with consumption as keeping tax rates in capital low 
levels. 
This rate differences in taxes affect tax obligations on company profits. The 
total share of taxes in Macedonia and Kosovo on profits happens to be 12,9% and 
15,2%, respectively while this share reaches to levels of 49,6%, 42% and 40,9% in 
Greece, Romania and Turkey, respectively. Macedonia pioneers in the region 
according to its simplicity of tax system. On the other hand, Albania, Serbia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina have the most complex tax payment systems (Doing, 
2016). According to fiscal freedom index, which is calculated by Heritage 
Foundation (2016) depending on PIT and CIT rates and composition of public 
debt, and shows whether or not public sector creates pressure on private sector, the 
best performance is obtained by Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bulgaria. 
On the other hand, comparing to these countries, Slovenia, Greece, Croatia and 
Turkey had lower performances. 
Tax applications of countries might have effects in investment decisions (Hall 
& Jorgenson, 1967; Hassett & Metcalf, 1999; Kargı, 2014a). Therefore, different 
tax applications, employed by region countries, have different effect levels on 
attracting investments. According to the scoring system, which is established by 
World Economic Forum (2015), the tax system in the region is most suitable to 
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attract investments in Macedonia and this country receives 4,6 out of 7 top point as 
it ranks 21 in the world. Accordingly, Montenegro is ranked 43. With the score of 
3,9 while Bulgaria is ranked 56. With the score of 2,8. On the other hand, Croatia, 
which has the lowest degree performance in the region is ranked 137 is ranked 137. 
With the score of 2,4; Greece is ranked 136. With the score of 2,5 and Slovenia is 
ranked 130. With the score of 2,7. 
 
Table 1. FDI Inflows and Some Chosen Tax Indicator for Balkan Countries  
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ALBANIA 1,15 8,7 397,10 15 23 20 36,5 3,2 357 34 87,8 
BOSNIA AND 
HERZ. 
0,50 2,7 130,13 10 10 17 23,3 2,8 420 45 83,9 
BULGARIA 1,97 3,5 272,87 10 10 20 27 3,8 423 14 91,1 
CROATIA 3,94 6,9 928,87 20 40 25 20 2,4 206 19 70,8 
GREECE 1,68 0,7 154,80 29 42 23 49,6 2,5 193 8 64,4 
KOSOVO 0,20 2,7 109,59 10 10 16 15,2 N.A 155 32 93,6 
MACEDONIA, 0,06 0,5 29,33 10 10 18 12,9 4,6 119 7 92,1 
MONTENEGRO 0,50 10,8 799,01 9 9 19 21,6 3,9 314 17 91,6 
ROMANIA 3,86 1,9 194,14 16 16 24 42 2,9 159 14 87,5 
SERBIA 2,00 4,6 280,46 15 15 20 39,7 2,9 244 42 84,3 
SLOVENIA 1,03 2,1 499,56 17 50 22 31 2,7 245 10 58,6 
TURKEY 12,7 1,6 168,11 20 35 18 40,9 3,5 226 11 75,2 
Source: World Bank, 2016; KPMG, 2016; World Economic Forum, 2015; Doing, 2016; Heritage 
Foundation, 2016; Imeri, 2013. 
 
FDI inflows and some tax related values belong to Balkan countries could be 
reached in Table-1 (the best values within its section is depicted as bold.) In an 
accumulated analysis of the data, the most interesting issue is that Macedonia could 
not reach a satisfactory level in terms of FDI inflows although it has utilized 
relatively positive tax structure. On the other hand, Montenegro has very good 
level of FDI inflows comparing to its population and GDP volume with parallel its 
low level of CIT and PIT rates. Moreover, Croatia and Albania have good 
performances even though they do not implement the best encouraging tax 
applications in the region. 
 
3. Literature  
Results of studies in which the relationship between FDI inflows and tax 
applications were examined are different from each other. Some of the studies 
concluded that tax incentives affect FDI inflows in positive manner. In their 
studies, where Klemm & Van Parys (2009) focused on some countries located in 
Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, they showed that host countries‟ tax 
applications had effects on FDI inflows. According to this study, 10% increase in 
CIT rates reduced the position of FDI inflows on GDP at a rate of 0,33% whereas 
10-year temporary tax exemption application increased the same share at a rate of 
1%. Additionally, they reached the finding of that an increase in public spending, 
which was another instrumental for public finance in this study, did not have any 
effects on FDI inflows. 
In their studies, where Demirhan & Masca (2008) focused on some developing 
countries, they remarked that high level of CIT rates and high inflation factors had 
negative effects on FDI inflows while such factors including market volume, 
infrastructure, trade openness and economic stability had positive effects on FDI 
inflows. In their studies, where Bénassy-Quéré et. al (2005) worked on 11 OECD 
countries, they remarked that tax differentiation among countries were important 
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and high level of CIT rates had negative effects on FDI while market potential and 
public investments affected FDI inflows in positive direction. 
In their studies, where Serin & Çalışkan (2010) focused on South East European 
(SEE) countries, they concluded that low level of tax rates and low level of public 
debt affected FDI in positive direction. Additionally, GDP volume, law reforms, 
EU membership, economic openness and regulation reduction had effects on FDI 
in positive manner. Buettner & Ruf (2005) determined that tax incentives and 
market volume had positive and labor costs had negative effects on German 
multinationals‟ investment decisions. 
In his study, where Hines (1996) examined different states of USA, remarked 
that tax incentives had effects on geographical positioning of FDI inflows to the 
country. Accordingly, foreign capital, which was brought to USA, was invested in 
the states according to their tax credit application while investors decided the 
states, which applied tax incentives, rather than others. In the study, where 
Babatunde (2012) worked on Nigeria‟s petroleum and natural gas industries, 
illustrated that there was a positive relationship between tax incentives and FDI 
inflows. Additionally, such factors including market volume, infrastructure, 
macroeconomic stability and politic risks had no effects on FDI inflow decisions 
for the related industries in Nigeria. 
On the other hand, in some studies, researchers concluded that there was not a 
relationship between tax incentives and FDI inflows (or the relationship was 
complex). Beyer (2002) determined that there was not a meaningful relationship 
between tax incentives and FDI inflows in the study, which was conducted for 
transition economies, however, he emphasized that this results should have 
implemented as public policies did not affect FDI inflows. According to him, Tax‟s 
long term levels and privatization of public institutions, rather than incentives such 
as short term tax exemptions, had effects on investments, in positive direction. 
Gastanaga et. al. (1998) determined that taxes did not create a pressure on FDI 
inflows in all conditions. Accordingly, taxes could be tolerated to some extent, in 
the framework of the nonlinear relationship between the two parameters. However, 
excluding effect of taxes on FDI inflows become increasingly dominant when the 
rates exceeded 20%. 
In their studies, where van Parys & James (2010) covered 12CFS Franc Zone 
countries, determined that temporary tax exemptions, which were implemented by 
these countries, had no effects on FDI inflows, on the other hand, factors including 
legal guarantees, which were offered to investors, and tax adaptation cost 
reduction, which was created as simplifying tax systems, increased the 
encouragement for FDI inflows. In her study, where Kersan-Škabić (2015) 
examined South East European (SEE) countries, she concluded that the important 
factors affecting FDI inflows were population, growth rapid, GDP per capita, 
infrastructure reforms and prices, on the other hand, they remarked that low level 
of tax rates did not carry importance on boosting FDI inflow. 
In her survey study, where Tuomi (2011) focused on the Republic of South 
Africa (RSA), researched the factors, which were taken into account by foreign 
companies while they decided to enter to this country. According to the study, the 
factors carrying high level of importance were “market volume” with 28%, 
“market growth rate” with 16%, “suitability of RSA to be used as a base location 
while exportation to African countries” with 13%, and “natural resources” with 
10%, on the other hand, incentives were ranked as the second last. A similar study 
was conducted by UNCTAD (2009), and the effects of tax and related incentives 
on international direct capital inflows were found to be very limited. According to 
the findings, obtained in this study, 17,1% of the investors declared that “market 
volume” was the most important factor while 15i9% of them declared that “market 
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growth rapid” was the most important factor while making investment decisions; 
on the other hand, only 2,5 % of them remarked “incentives” had such importance. 
 
4. Model and Application 
In the study, annual data belong to 11 Balkan Countries for the period of 2006-
2014 was utilized. Tax reforms, which were applied by countries in order to attract 
more foreign capital, were important factors to choose these countries as sample. 
Study limits are consisted of obtaining data for the countries in the country group 
and short term data existence in the time level. Data, belong to the countries, was 
obtained from The World Bank and KPMG (Retrieved from]. In the study, System 
GMM was preferred. 
Descriptive statistics for the variables, used in this study, are presented in 
Table-2. There are totally 10 macro data for 12 countries. Tax of Profit and Value 
Added Taxes are used for the purpose of financial indicators. Other instrumental 
variables are included into the model to measure the model‟s explanatory power. 
 
Table-2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FDI (% GDP)L-1 98 6.015 6.633 -.689 37.410 
FDIL-1 98 3.510 4.770 -3.460 2.200 
Value Added Taxes (VAT) 99 .1961 .0220 .17 .25 
Taxof Profit (TOP) 99 .3322 .1154 .07 .57 
Growth (Gr) 99 1.935 4.201 -9.132 10.088 
Gdp Per Cap (Gdp/per) 99 10386.95 7481.68 3005.01 31686.65 
Real Interest (r) 75 6.1466 3.3999 -3.1185 12.6816 
Unemployed (Unp) 99 15.93 8.38 4.4 36 
Political Stabilty (PS) 99 .018 .566 -1.200 1.1210 
Employer (Emp) 92 44.56 6.87 29.7 56.9 
 
3 different models were established in order to test the relationship between tax 
obligations and foreign direct investment movements. The models, used in this 
study, were obtained through developing models of Slemrod (1990). 
 
Model 1:  
FDI(%GDP) = β1 FDI(%GDP)L-1 + β2TOP + β3Gr + β4 r + β5 Unp + β6 Ps + β7 Emp (1) 
Model 2:  
FDI(%GDP) = β1 FDI(%GDP)L-1 + β2TOP + β3 Gdp/Per + β4 r + β5 Unp + β6 Ps + β7 Emp (2) 
Model 3: 
FDI = β1 FDIL-1 + β2VAT + β3 Gr + β4 r + β5 Unp + β6 Ps     (3) 
 
The variables in the models FDI (%GDP) represents the ratio of foreign direct 
capital amount to national income. FDI variable is included to the model as foreign 
direct capital amount. Value added tax and tax of profit variables are used in the 
model to determine tax incentives. Macro variables, used in the model, are growth, 
GDP per capita, real interest rates, unemployment, political stability and 
employment. Empiric results of the model are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Relationship between Tax Obligations and Foreign Direct Investment Movements  
(System GMM Approach) 
Independent Variables 
1.2. Model Dependent Variable: FDI (% GDP)      3. Model Dependent 
Variable (FDI) 
Model-I Model-II Model-III 
Coefficien
t 
Std.  
Error 
Coefficient 
Std.  
Error 
Coefficient 
Std.  
Error 
FDI (% GDP)t-1 
0.273 
(1.80)* 
.1515 
0.266 
(1.73)* 
.1543   
FDIL-1     
.429 
(4.16)*** 
.1033 
Value Added Tax (VAT)     
-4.37 
(-2.13)** 
2.50 
Tax of Profits (TOP) 
51.147 
(3.11)*** 
16.440 
51.905 
(3.36)*** 
15.457   
Growth (Gr) 
0.081 
(0.61) 
0.1318   
1.240 
(2.06)** 
5.990 
GDP Per Cap (Gdp/Per)   
-0.0003 
(-0.60) 
0.0005   
Real Interest (r) 
-0.699 
(-3.53)*** 
.1983 
-0.798 
(-5.11)** 
.1562 
-3.790 
(-4.30)*** 
8.880 
Unemployed (UNP) 
0.219 
(0.94) 
.2325 
0.2121 
(0.89) 
.2377 
1.280 
(1.13) 
1.140 
Political Stability (PS) 
-1.087 
(-0.39) 
2.774 
-0.4034 
(0.15) 
2.772 
3.340 
(0.03) 
9.820 
Employer (EMP) 
0.553 
(0.80) 
.695 
.4804 
(0.68) 
.7034   
Number of Observation 38 38 56 
Number of Country 7 7 9 
Arellano Bond Test    
AR (2) -0.35086 [0.7257] -0.50235 [0.6154] 0.12068[0.9038] 
Sargan-2  31.71501 [0.674] 31.650 [0.1076] 26.269[0.5037] 
Wald Chi2 135.42[0.000] 136.27[0.0000] 175.44[0.000] 
İnstrumental Variable 30 30 33 
Notes: Explanations: ***, **, * represents p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.10, respectively. 
 
Dynamic models (System GMM) structurally use one term delayed value as 
independent variable (instrumental variable). This value must statistically a 
relationship insignificant level of 10%.  
In Model 1, a strong and positive relationship between FDI (%GDP) variable 
and one term delayed value, was found in significant level of 10%. a strong and 
positive relationship between taxes of profit and dependent variable was found in 
significant level of 1%.the increase of taxes of profit led to a parallel increase in 
FDI amount, thus this consequence showed that taxes did not have the prior 
importance on FDI inflows to the region. As also clarified in some studies 
(Morisset & Pirnia, 2000; Tuomi, 2011; UNCTAD, 2009); tax rates might have 
determinacy level depending on other conditions (infrastructure, transportation 
activities, market volume, economic and political stability etc.). Therefore, in a 
scenario that a country is inferior to another in terms of the related conditions, the 
country might create racing to bottom problem while causing to deficiency in 
public services as it decreases its tax rates in a belief to increase FDI inflows 
(James, 2013). Additionally, a negative relationship was found between foreign 
capital amounts and Real interest rates in significant level of 10%. Statistically 
strong relationships could be found between other variables and dependent 
variable. Sargan test was applied to check the suitability of instrumental variables, 
which were used in the model, and endogeneity problem within instrumental 
variables was not found. Autocorrelation was tested as applying Arellano Bond 
test. It could be observed that (AR 2) Autocorrelation problem did not exist in level 
2. 
Model was re-established as using GDP per capita values for model 2 as 
replacing growth rate, as it was used in Model 1, yet, similar results were achieved. 
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a positive relationship was found between tax of profit and FDI (%GDP), which 
was used as dependent variable, in statistically significant level of 1%. According 
to autocorrelation test results of the model, the model was not auto-correlated. 
Sargan test was applied for instrumental variables. Endogeneity problem within 
instrumental variables in the model was not found 
FDI, in dollar, was used as a dependent variable in Model 3. A positive 
relationship was found between dependent variable and one term delayed value, in 
statistically significant level of 1%. Value added taxes were included to the model 
as tax obligation indicators. A negative relationship was found between value 
added taxes and FDI, in statistically significant level of 5%. The findings of this 
study matched with the studies (Desai et.al, 2004; Miller et.al, 2013) in the related 
literature. A positive relationship was found between dependent variable and 
growth variable, in statistically significant level of 5%. A negative relationship was 
found between foreign direct capital investments and real interest, in statistically 
significant level of 1%. A statistically strong relationship was not found between 
unemployment and political stability. Arellano Bond test was used for correlation 
test of the model and the model was not found auto-correlated. Suitability of 
instrumental variables was tested with Sargan Test and instrumental variables were 
found suitable. 
 
5. Conclusion  
The findings of this study reflect the existence of a relationship between tax 
incentives and foreign direct capital investments however; different results were 
achieved for different countries and economies. This differentiation is affected by 
many factors including tax, public spending, infrastructure, geographical 
conditions and political stability, which are unique to countries and economies. The 
relationship between tax of profits and foreign direct capital investments is derived 
from differences in tax rates of other countries, depending on region conditions. 
Gastanaga et. al., (1998) remarked, in their studies, that tax rates would not directly 
affect foreign direct capital investments as long as tax rates did not exceed the 
optimal level. 
As the limit of this study, time series of the region countries were restricted and 
many data could not be obtained, therefore further findings could not be achieved. 
In the future studies, the model should be re-established with a longer time series 
and section series, and then the results should be re-evaluated. 
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